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ABSTRACT 
 
High fidelity, three-dimensional computer models based on a CAD drawing of an intermodal 
cargo container, representative payload objects, and detector array panels were developed to 
simulate the underlying physical events taking place during active interrogation. These computer 
models are used to assess the performance of interrogation systems with different sources and 
detection schemes. In this presentation, we will show that the use oversimplified models, such as 
analyzing homogenized payloads only, can lead to errors in determining viable approaches for 
interrogation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Active interrogation of nuclear material hidden in cargo containers has become an important 
research topic for homeland security. Active interrogation involves probing a container with 
highly penetrating particles such as neutrons or photons to induce fission in the nuclear material 
and subsequently detect the emitted fission signals (secondary neutrons and gammas).  Generally, 
a neutron source is used when strong photon-absorbing cargo (e.g., thick metal materials) or 
shielding is present, and a photon source is used when strong neutron-absorbing (e.g., 
hydrogenous materials) shielding or payload material is present.  The fission-induced radiations 
that could be detected are either prompt (instantaneously emitted) or delayed (up to 100 seconds) 
neutrons and gamma-rays.  Much attention has focused on using the delayed gamma-ray signal 
for active interrogation because these gammas can emerge from a cargo-laden container to be 
detected and their yield per fission event is relatively high.   Because cargo containers have very 
diverse and complex cargos, one must rely on modeling and simulation to assess the utility of a 
proposed active interrogation system.  Systems based on delayed gamma counting have been 
favored because models predict that neutron counting would fail if the nuclear material was 
hidden in thick hydrogenous cargo.  However, we find that in many instances the oversimplified 
models failed to take into account the characteristics of the usual cargo that would be inspected.  
To overcome some of these deficiencies, we have developed very high fidelity models of the 
cargo container itself as well as representative cargo payloads.  Simulations using these models 
more accurately account for the underlying physical events that can occur during particle 
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transport. The performance of the interrogation system can then be optimized more accurately.  
For example, we show the importance of incorporating a neutron counting scheme and that the 
background of a delayed gamma counting scheme should not be neglected in neutron-based 
interrogation systems. 
 
Some active interrogation techniques propose detecting the high-energy delayed gamma signal 
from fission,[ 1, 2] but defining and extracting the background radiation in a measurement can be 
very difficult. The reason is that counting these gammas is not foolproof especially when the 
system is based on a D-T neutron source due to its high (n,γ), (n,n’γ) and (n,xγ) activation of 
surrounding materials. Although decay gammas from activation using a photon interrogation 
source is expected to be lower, it is still important to improve the signal-to-background ratio by 
selecting only high-energy gammas from fission products with specific half-lives.[ 3] While our 
analysis is presently limited to prompt gammas only, the results obtained using a D-D neutron-
based source suggests one should not rely only on detecting delayed gamma but, instead, more 
reliable interrogations will be made using both delayed gamma and prompt neutron signals. 
 
 
2. COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH 
 
The Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) code was chosen for our modeling and 
simulation effort because it has a broad range of features in terms of its validated physics models, 
extensive nuclear databases, parallel computation capability and the ability to handle complex 
geometries.[ 4] A very detailed model of the cargo container has been developed based on 
computer-aided design (CAD) drawings of an actual International Standard Organization (ISO) 
cargo container.[ 5] We have also developed five cargo payload models consisting of oak wood, 
glass-bottled water, laptop computers, automobile engines, and a block of borated polyethylene. 
The usual configuration is the payload material fills the cargo container sitting inside a room 
with concrete floor and walls. The concrete room has an internal space of ~12×16×8 m
3
. A point 
neutron source is located at the center of the room and is positioned 1.4 meters above the 
concrete floor. The walls and ceiling are assumed to be 1 meter thick of concrete and the 
simulations take into account any scattered signals from these surfaces. 
 
2.1. ISO Cargo Container Model 
 
The cargo container is located a half meter from the point neutron source and has a capacity of 
~6×2×2 m
3
 for its payload volume. Figure 1 shows the container model rendered with 
MCNPVISED and composed by GIMP.[ 6, 7] The model includes detailed features of the 
container such as the corrugated panels, corner posts, corner fittings, rails, forklift pockets, 
plywood floor, etc. The container has an empty (tare) weight of 2,200 kg and its payload has a 
weight limit of 28,280 kg. For the active interrogation simulations, we used an 8-kg sphere of 
uranium located at the center of the container. Steels with different compositions are used for 
different parts of the container to ensure the best accuracy in the simulation results. Table I lists 
most of the material compositions and densities used in the container model as well as the 
material compositions used in the payload models. For materials that are not listed, they are 
either pure elements or their compositions are described separately in the following sections. 
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Table I Material composition used in the computer model 
 
Material Composition (atomic fraction %) Density (g/cm
3
) 
Oakwood 0.7 
Plywood 
Nat
C6
1
H9.99885
2
H.00115
16
O4.98785
17
O0.0019
18
O0.01025 
0.5 
SPA-H steel 
Nat
C (0.55064) 
28
Si (1.35742) 
29
Si (0.06893) 
30
Si (0.04544) 
55
Mn (0.50160) 
31
P (0.26691) 
32
S (0.06895) 
63
Cu (0.35995) 
65
Cu (0.16044) 
50
Cr (0.05757) 
52
Cr (1.11017) 
53
Cr (0.12588) 
54
Cr (0.03134) 
58
Ni (0.41552) 
60
Ni (0.16006) 
61
Ni (0.00696) 
62
Ni (0.02218) 
64
Ni (0.00565) 
54
Fe (5.53430) 
56
Fe (86.87672) 
57
Fe (2.00636) 
58
Fe (0.26701) 
SS490 steel 
Nat
C (1.01145) 
28
Si (0.45335) 
29
Si (0.02302) 
30
Si (0.01517) 
55
Mn (1.40720) 
31
P (0.06240) 
32
S (0.06909) 
54
Fe (5.66721) 
56
Fe (88.96314) 
57
Fe (2.05455) 
58
Fe (0.27342) 
SM490A steel 
Nat
C (0.92071) 
28
Si (0.99868) 
29
Si (0.05071) 
30
Si (0.03343) 
55
Mn (1.61035) 
31
P (0.06248) 
32
S (0.06918) 
54
Fe (5.62607) 
56
Fe (88.31732) 
57
Fe (2.03963) 
58
Fe (0.27144) 
SCW49 steel 
(cast steel) 
Nat
C (1.00658) 
28
Si (1.44373) 
29
Si (0.07331) 
30
Si (0.04833) 
55
Mn (1.50045) 
31
P (0.07097) 
32
S (0.06875) 
63
Cu (0.35891) 
65
Cu (0.15997) 
50
Cr (0.02296) 
52
Cr (0.44278) 
53
Cr (0.05021) 
54
Cr (0.01250) 
58
Ni (0.31870) 
60
Ni (0.12276) 
61
Ni (0.00534) 
62
Ni (0.01702) 
64
Ni (0.00433) 
54
Fe (5.51022) 
56
Fe (86.49870) 
57
Fe (1.99763) 
58
Fe (0.26585) 
7.85 
Air 
Nat
C (0.01502) 
14
N (78.44743) 
16
O (21.01933) 
17
O (0.00801) 
18
O (0.04319) 
Nat
Ar (0.46702) 
1.293×10
-3 
Concrete 
16
O (56.18138) 
17
O (0.02140) 
18
O (0.11545) 
28
Si (18.74395) 
29
Si (0.95177) 
30
Si (0.62742) 
Nat
Ca (1.85946) 
27
Al (2.13429) 
23
Na (2.13651) 
1
H (16.80183) 
2
H (0.00193) 
54
Fe (0.02482) 
56
Fe (0.38959) 
57
Fe (0.00900) 
58
Fe (0.00120) 
2.3 
Yellow-green 
glass 
28
Si (21.75948) 
29
Si (1.10489) 
30
Si (0.72835) 
Nat
Ca (4.33345) 
23
Na (6.83999) 
Nat
C (3.41685) 
54
Fe (0.00212) 
56
Fe (0.03327) 
57
Fe (0.00077) 
58
Fe (0.00010) 
16
O (61.63060) 
17
O (0.02348) 
18
O (0.12665) 
2.536 
Water 
16
O (33.17708) 
17
O (0.01264) 
18
O (0.06818) 
1
H (66.49893) 
2
H (0.00762) 
Nat
C (0.00015) 
14
N (0.00005) 
Nat
Ca (0.20929) 
23
Na (0.02606) 
0.997 
Compact disc 
Nat
C (48.61273) 
1
H (42.24832) 
2
H (0.00484) 
16
O (9.10228) 
17
O (0.00347) 
18
O (0.01870) 
27
Al (0.00966) 
1.2 
Low density 
polyethylene 
Nat
C
1
H1.99977
2
H0.00023 0.016 
Li ion battery 
Nat
C (50.00000) 
1
H (19.22855) 
2
H (0.00221) 
16
O (13.42883) 
17
O (0.00511) 
18
O (0.02760) 
19
F (11.53846) 
31
P (1.92308) 
59
Co (1.92308) 
6
Li (0.14596) 
7
Li (1.77712) 
2.382 
Fictitious 
laptop screen 
28
Si (5.76436) 
29
Si (0.29270) 
30
Si (0.19295) 
Nat
C (37.50000) 
1
H (37.49568) 
2
H (0.00431) 
16
O (18.70444) 
17
O (0.00712) 
18
O (0.03844) 
0.779 
Hard disc 
platter 
27
Al (93.33333) 
54
Fe (0.38967) 
56
Fe (6.11693) 
57
Fe (0.14127) 
58
Fe (0.01880) 2.631 
HEU 235U (90) 238U (10) 18.84 
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Figure 1 A 20’×8’×8.5’ dry freight ISO cargo container 
 
 
2.2. Payload Models 
 
Five different kinds of cargo payloads were studied: two representing homogenous cargos and 
three representing heterogeneous cargos. The two homogeneous models are oak wood and 
borated polyethylene. Oak wood is modeled by having the cargo container completely filled with 
0.7 g/cm
3
 cellulose. For the second model, we used a 2.4×2.4×2.4 m
3
 cube of 1.2 g/cm
3
 borated 
polyethylene consisting of 32 wt/% boron-10 and 68 wt/% of polyethylene situated at the center 
of the container. 
 
The first (heterogeneous) model is of a laptop computer inside its cardboard shipping box. The 
laptop consists of three different layers of (smeared) material components: a hard disc platter, 
copper heat sink and a lithium-ion battery. (See Figure 2) The densities and material 
compositions for the screen layer and hard disc platter are listed in Table I. The layer 
representing the computer motherboard is silicon dioxide with a trace amount of gold and has a 
density of 2.4 g/cm
3
. The remaining layer consists of polyethylene with a density of 0.5 g/cm
3
 
and the copper heat sink with a density of 3 g/cm
3
. The densities are chosen in such a way that 
the mass is equal to typical weight of these components. The composition of the power supply is 
50% iron plus 50% copper and the unit weighs 250 g. The power cords and cables are 
approximated by two polyethylene rods with density of 0.92 g/cm
3
. Both the paper box and 
cardboard paper divider have the same composition as plywood but their densities are chosen to 
be 0.5 g/cm
3
 and 0.6 g/cm
3
 respectively. The outside dimensions of the paper box are 39×16×34 
cm
3
. Each boxed laptop weighs 5.6 kg and a total of (15×14×7=) 1,470 laptops are loaded into 
one cargo container. 
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Figure 2 Heterogeneous payload models: computer laptop in a box, glass bottled water, and engine 
 
 
We have also developed a model of packaged bottled water. The bottle is 26 cm tall and its 
largest diameter is 9 cm. The model is created in MCNPX using combinations of ellipsoids, 
cones and cylinders. The thickness of the bottle is obtained by adjustment of the inner ellipsoid, 
cone and cylinder until the calculated mass from the model matches the measured mass of a 
commercially available water bottle (i.e. ~430 g). The cargo container can be filled with 14,175 
bottles (or 9×5×3= 135 cases) of water. 
 
The remaining heterogeneous payload model is of an inline four-cylinder engine found in a 
typical imported gasoline automobile. Each engine weighs ~144 kg and has an overall dimension 
of 20×46×46 cm
3
 as shown in Figure 2. Because iron has a very high inelastic scattering cross 
section for neutrons and different kinds of engine blocks are made of different alloys, our model 
assumes the whole engine is made of cast steel to provide a more conservative estimate in the 
simulations. There are (7×5×5=) 175 engines stacks inside the middle 1.5 m of the container with 
each engine separated from its neighbor by by ~2 cm. 
 
2.3. Detector Panels Model 
 
The interrogation system model also includes two sets of detector panel frameworks: one on the 
source side and one on the far side of the container. A simplified detector panel framework is 
used to determine the expected numbers of photons or neutrons that strike the detector (see 
Figure 3). Unlike the detectors on the far side of the container, the source side has the center 
panel removed to allow the neutron source to operate from that location. Both sets of detector 
panels are a half centimeter away from the side panels of the container and tallies are made at ~4 
cm away from the side panels. Each panel can be filled with three different kinds of detectors in 
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a tricusp pattern. Currently, the detector panel framework is not filled with any material and is 
used only for defining the regions where neutron and gamma detectors will be placed. 
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Figure 3 Detector panels (scales are in centimeter) 
 
 
2.4. Other General Assumptions 
 
The source neutrons are produced with the beam directed perpendicularly to the cargo 
container’s side wall with the source 50 cm from the wall. For a typical D-D neutron generator, 
the neutron energy will depend on the angle of emission with a maximum energy of 2.78 MeV in 
the forward direction (i.e. 0°), and a minimum energy of 2.18 MeV at its backward angle (i.e. 
180°). All source neutrons are assumed to be emitted at time zero. 
 
Several quantities are tallied in the simulations including the induced fission rate, neutron 
production rate, (n,2n) reaction rate, (n,3n) reaction rate, fission neutron yields and neutron 
lifetimes. The fission neutron yields (nubar) are sampled from a Gaussian distribution. Neutrons 
are transported in analog mode with explicit capture as implicit capture imposed. If implicit 
capture was adopted, the Monte Carlo calculation will spend more computer time on sampling 
the less important low-energy neutrons. We are in favor of performing analog transport 
calculation because we plan to make use of the energy deposition tally and pulse height tally in 
our future work with these computer models. The current release version of MCNPX prohibits 
the use of energy deposition tally and pulse height tally in non-analog transport mode. The 
neutron current at the detector panels is tallied with six energy bins and six time bins as listed in 
Table II. The gamma current tallies use the same time binning as the neutron current tallies but 
the gamma current tallies have more energy bins to help distinguish discrete gamma lines from 
the gammas with continuum distribution. These energy bins were chosen manually so that they 
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bound some of the intense gamma lines from neutron interactions with materials defined in the 
computer model. 
 
 
Table II Neutron energy bins and time bins for the current tally 
 
Energy 0.625 eV 100 eV 100 keV 2.8 MeV 8 MeV 20 MeV 
Time 10 ns 100 ns 1 µs 5 µs 100 µs 1029 s 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
For an active interrogation system, the most important parameters are the number (counts) of 
detectable signals and signal-to-background ratio. There are two common ways to improve 
signal-to-background ratio: time and energy discriminations of the detected signals. These two 
discriminating parameters can be applied separately but they usually work best when both are 
applied together. As mentioned earlier, the fission-induced signals from nuclear materials that 
could be detected are prompt gammas, delayed gammas, prompt neutrons and delayed neutrons. 
The MCNPX version used in our simulations does not have the capability to compute the 
delayed gamma-ray distribution. We found that the gamma background (due to activation) is 
orders-of-magnitude higher than the prompt fission gamma signals, thus rendering this signal not 
attractive. 
 
Our simulations did include both prompt and delayed neutrons signals. However, the delayed 
neutron fractions for most common nuclear materials are less than 1% (e.g. 0.685 % for thermal 
neutron fission of 
235
U) and their average neutron energies are hundreds of keV (e.g. 405 keV for 
235
U). As a result, delayed neutrons contribute very little to the detectable signal in an active 
interrogation scenario and the neutron current tallies at the detector are actually only a measure 
of the prompt fission neutrons, although delayed neutrons are included in the simulations. The 
simulation results of the neutron current tallies for the heterogeneous payloads are shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
It is evident that fast neutrons which hit the detector panels from the source have energies less 
than 100 keV within 100 µs after they are born. Thus, any fast neutrons detected after 100 µs 
could only come from the nuclear material in the container or from natural background. (Note: 
while there is no other time bin between 5 µs and 100 µs, it should be possible to gate the 
detector with shorter off time like 20 µs.) Since the fast neutron background at sea level is 
expected to be less than 3×10
-3
 n/cm
2
-s,[ 8] the number that hit a detector panel would be less 
than 12 n/s. Figure 4 shows that the minimum number of fast fission neutrons that hit a single 
detector panel in our three heterogeneous model scenarios is greater than 5×10
-9
 neutrons per 
source neutron. Thus, a neutron source having an intensity of ≥5×10
10
 n/s would have a fast 
fission neutron signal-to-background ratio better than 20:1. 
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Units are neutrons per source neutron ± SD
Bottled Water PayloadLaptop computers Payload Engine Payload
0
3.71×10−9±3.68%
1.74×10−9±5.36%
0
9.11×10−9±2.37%
4.69×10−9±3.37%
0
3.75×10−9±3.67%
1.61×10−9±5.58%
0
8.71×10−9±2.42%
4.63×10−9±3.30%
0
7.92×10−8±0.86%
3.30×10−8±1.26%
0
4.00×10−9±3.58%
2.60×10−9±4.39%
0
5.70×10−9±2.99%
3.94×10−9±3.57%
0
4.62×10−7±5.84%
2.25×10−7±8.35%
0
4.39×10−7±6.05%
2.08×10−7±8.69%
0
4.03×10−7±6.28%
2.20×10−7±8.54%
0
4.55×10−7±5.98%
2.51×10−7±7.97%
0
1.09×10−6±3.86%
5.24×10−7±5.54%
0
4.84×10−7±5.72%
2.75×10−7±7.53%
0
4.98×10−7±5.68%
2.88×10−7±7.45%
0
3.39×10−8±1.52%
2.99×10−9±4.57%
0
3.19×10−8±1.57%
1.63×10−9±6.22%
0
3.36×10−8±1.52%
2.86×10−9±4.68%
0
3.11×10−8±1.59%
1.59×10−9±6.26%
0
8.29×10−8±1.12%
1.11×10−8±2.37%
0
3.70×10−8±1.48%
2.34×10−9±5.17%
0
3.46×10−8±1.52%
2.03×10−9±5.59%
w/SNM, En>2.8 MeV, t>0
w/SNM, 100 keV<En<2.8 MeV, t>100µs;
w/o SNM, 100 keV<En<2.8 MeV, t>100µs;
 
Figure 4 Neutron currents at the detector panels for different payloads 
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Unlike the large signal-to-noise ratio and copious amount of fast fission neutrons leaking out of 
the cargo container in the heterogeneous hydrogenous (bottled water) model, simulations with 
homogeneous hydrogenous payloads (oak wood and borated polyethylene) show that the fast 
fission neutron signal cannot be detected. Table III lists the fission rates for each payload model 
as well as two extra payloads which were simulated for comparison purposes: a homogenous 
steel cube with a density and total volume equivalent to the engine model (i.e. ~3 g/cm
3
 and 
~2×2×2 m
3
) and a polyethylene cube having a density of ~0.8 g/cm
3
. 
 
 
Table III Induced fission rate for different payloads 
 
Oak wood 
Laptop 
computers 
Bottled water Engine 
Smeared steel 
cuboid 
Borated 
polyethylene
† 
Polyethylene 
w/o boron
†
 
1.8×10
-6 
4.3×10
-4 
1.2×10
-4 
2.1×10
-4 
2.0×10
-4
 5.4×10
-11 
9.4×10
-9 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Our simulation results show that D-D neutron interrogation works well except when the payload 
consists of thick uniform hydrogenous material. This is expected as hydrogenous materials are 
strong neutron absorbers and have very high moderation power. Once a source neutron becomes 
thermalized, it will very likely be trapped locally and get absorbed before a fission event can 
occur. Even if fission events can occur, the fission neutrons lose so much energy on their way 
back out that it is impossible to distinguish them from other thermalized source neutrons. On the 
other hand, the bottled water (i.e. heterogeneous hydrogenous payload) scenario shows that the 
empty space between each bottle provides (streaming) flight paths almost completely free from 
collisions and ,thereby, makes fast fission neutron counting possible. The steel cube model 
shows that a homogeneous non-hydrogenous payload does not have a significant effect on 
fission rate and detectable signals. In fact, the fission rate of the steel cube model is only 5 % less 
than that of the (heterogeneous) engine model, and the fast fission neutron signals are very 
similar.  
 
Since a fast fission neutron detection scheme fails for the thick uniform hydrogenous payload, 
we considered a counting scheme for fission-induced gamma-rays. As mentioned earlier, the 
prompt gammas cannot be used because their intensity is several orders-of-magnitude lower than 
the activation background. Energy and time discrimination methods are a possibility, but these 
techniques cannot improve the signal-to-background ratio because there are not many intense 
high-energy gamma lines. Therefore, the only remaining option is to use the delayed gamma 
signal. The drawback to the latter approach is that D-D neutrons (~2.5 MeV average energy) are 
not penetrating enough to cause adequate fission in a reasonable counting time for hydrogenous 
materials (e.g. oak wood, polyethylene or borated polyethylene). 
 
An alternative option is to use a higher energy (e.g. D-T) neutron source for interrogating the 
cargo container. Although with a higher energy neutron source one gains in penetrability, the 
                                                 
† The neutron source is 23.82 cm away from the container side panel instead of a half meter and the detector panel is 20 cm away 
from the container side panel for the polyethylene and borated polyethylene cases. 
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problem is that the average energy of the prompt fission neutrons is ~2 MeV so they cannot 
make their way out of a container if it is filled with homogenous hydrogenous material. When 
the D-D neutron source is replaced with a D-T neutron source, the fission rate is 1.3×10
-6
 fission 
per source neutron in the polyethylene scenario and practically no fission neutrons can leak out 
of the container. Nevertheless, this fission rate is high enough to allow delayed gamma-rays 
counting in a reasonable inspection time. On the other hand, the 14-MeV neutrons from a D-T 
source also lead to a large gamma-ray background which interferes with the delayed gamma 
signal one is trying to detect. For example, the 
16
O(n,p) reaction at a threshold energy of about 
10-MeV produces 
16
N which decays with a half-life that falls in the same delayed gamma 
counting time window. In this case, D-D neutrons have an advantage of having no such 
background because their energy is well below the threshold energy for this reaction. The prompt 
gammas tallied in the simulations show that the background for the detectors on the source side 
can be ~30 times higher than the detectors on the opposite side of the container. We also found 
that the fission rate calculated with borated polyethylene shielding is ~30 times less compared to 
the polyethylene without boron. Thus, the background caused by the D-T source activation of 
surrounding materials can be up to 200 times higher than the fission gamma signal implying that 
this source would be ineffective for dense homogeneous-hydrogenous cargo. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
High fidelity simulations show that a 2.5-MeV D-D neutrons provide viable interrogation of 
cargo containers with normal payloads, but are less useful when thick hydrogenous materials are 
present. For the latter case, a 14-MeV D-T neutron source cannot be considered as a 
straightforward solution in terms of its increased penetrability alone.  To address this issue, we 
have started to analyze high-energy photon sources for interrogation and will use the same 
detailed computational models to predict their performance for detecting useful signals.  
Preliminary indications are that using the combination of a high-energy photon source and a D-D 
neutron source will be most effective system for inspecting cargo containers. 
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